Alternatives Futures in War and Conflict by Renner, Michael
Naval War College Review
Volume 53
Number 4 Autumn Article 5
2000
Alternatives Futures in War and Conflict
Michael Renner
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Renner, Michael (2000) "Alternatives Futures in War and Conflict," Naval War College Review: Vol. 53 : No. 4 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol53/iss4/5
ALTERNATIVE FUTURES IN WAR AND CONFLICT
Michael Renner
The vast majority of today’s armed conflicts are not traditional wars betweenstates or coalitions of states, but rather internal conflicts. The fighting is
done as often by paramilitary forces, guerrilla groups, ethnic militias, vigilante
squads, and even criminal gangs and mercenaries as by regular, uniformed sol-
diers. Small-arms proliferation is a key phenomenon, a challenge that needs to
be addressed urgently.
Out of a total of 108 armed conflicts during 1989–98, as tallied by the Con-
flict Data Project at the University of Uppsala, Sweden, ninety-two took place
exclusively within the boundaries of a single country. Another nine involved
intrastate conflict with foreign intervention. Just seven wars during that de-
cade were interstate wars.1As one analyst has sug-
gested, “The future is Chechnya.” Indeed, it is the
present and the future.
THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY
In 1999, three interstate wars were active: the border war
pitting Ethiopia against Eritrea, Indian-Pakistani clashes
over control of Kashmir, and an on-again, off-again
U.S.-British aerial bombing campaign against Iraq. The
Chechen, East Timor, and Kosovo conflicts are today
hybrid cases: Chechnya had become separate from Rus-
sia, a de facto entity after the 1996 war, although it was
not internationally recognized as a sovereign state. East
Timor, on the other hand, had never been part of Indo-
nesia, even though it had been occupied since 1975.
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Kosovo was part of Yugoslavia during the 1999 war and remains so officially, but
it is now under international occupation and administration and is severing all
ties to Yugoslavia.
Clearly, there will continue to be at least some interstate conflicts. The rela-
tionship between India and Pakistan, for example, is again at a low and may well
degenerate into large-scale violence. Given that both countries are now nuclear
powers, this cannot but be an extremely worrying situation to the rest of the
world. But it is less clear that U.S. military policy will in any way be able to affect
the outcome and make full-scale war between the two neighbors less likely.
Imaginative, committed diplomacy would seem to be a far better approach.
We also cannot exclude the possibility that relations with the Russian Federa-
tion will deteriorate to the point of a new cold war (though Russia is now far
weaker militarily and economically than during Soviet times). This may call for
a policy of military preparedness, but a strong argument can be made for a dif-
ferent approach. Russia having been ignored and even humiliated by the West
(in Nato’s expansion, the Kosovo war, etc.) and having suffered through the
economic disaster of the past decade (during which Moscow’s policy was
heavily influenced by Western advice), it would seem that a Russian strong-
man—President Vladimir Putin?—would find substantial support for a hard-
line foreign and military policy. It is high time to rethink U.S. policy toward
Russia and to acknowledge that a focus on military deterrence (in the event of
significantly deteriorating relations) may be the worst of all options.
It is important to realize that the violence of many contemporary armed
struggles is less an expression of clear political or military objectives (such as in-
vading a neighboring country or annexing territory) than of the chaos emanat-
ing from state failure. An underlying factor is the inability of states to create or
maintain conditions conducive to the welfare of their populations. More than 40
percent of the states in the bottom half of the Human Development Index in 1998
(published in the UN Development Program’s human development report) expe-
rienced war on their territories sometime during the previous decade.2
What this suggests is that we are dealing far less than heretofore with tradi-
tional scenarios, in which threats are readily identifiable; the nature of conflicts
is increasingly diffuse and complex. There is little point in trying to predict a
successor to the “Soviet threat” (in the sense of an all-encompassing, bipo-
lar-type struggle), because it is highly unlikely that one will materialize, not-
withstanding all the conjecture about China. An American military response or
deterrence posture may be close to irrelevant for most conflicts we may expect.
So why should the United States be concerned? Internal conflicts are more
likely to trigger humanitarian concerns than security issues. But intrastate fight-
ing can spill over borders to destabilize a larger region (as in Central Africa at
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present); it can draw outside intervention, which in turn may lead to confronta-
tions among larger powers; it can cause large-scale refugee flows, with debilitat-
ing political consequences in host countries; it can lead frustrated partisans to
resort to desperate, terrorist measures to gain the attention of a neglectful world
or to seek revenge against outside powers that are supporting, or are seen to be
supporting, an opposing side.
Professor Paul Kennedy and others have referred to “pivotal” states—those
that warrant close attention by the United States, where the American stake in
sociopolitical stability is high but the risks of political collapse are high as well.3
This focus may seem to make eminent sense; there is a need to prioritize, and
some conflicts affect the United States (or the world as a whole) more than oth-
ers do. The difficulty is that what starts out as a limited conflict in a “noncritical”
region can snowball into a major problem. The conflict in Rwanda serves as an
instructive example. Even when genocidal violence took place in Rwanda in
1994, the Clinton administration preferred not to get involved in the conflict; it
blocked proposals to reinforce UN peacekeepers in the country to stop the kill-
ings, and it took pains to avoid the term “genocide” in reference to the situation.
The rationale was that Rwanda was simply not important enough to the United
States. However, this judgment turned out to be a major mistake; the Rwanda
conflict subsequently spilled over into the former Zaire, and it continues to fes-
ter. Several neighboring countries, including Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe,
Rwanda, and Uganda, have decided to intervene in the spillover civil war. It is far
from clear at this time what the long-term consequences of that conflict will be
for the region. This example suggests that it may be a wiser policy to focus on hu-
man rights and human well-being than on supposed “strategic” interests in de-
ciding which conflicts merit U.S. attention.
The “health” of societies—their economic well-being, their ability to assure a
reasonable degree of social justice and equity, their ability to preserve their natu-
ral environments—is in fact ultimately the most important issue, and no
amount of defense spending and military sophistication can repair its loss. In
fact, one can argue that too great an emphasis on military means may absorb the
very resources that are needed to guarantee a healthy society.
A multitude of pressures and instabilities threaten to shred the social fabric of
many societies today, particularly those in the developing world. A toxic brew of
growing disparities in wealth, persistent poverty, increasing unemployment and
job insecurity, population growth, and environmental degradation is provoking
ever more social discontent and polarization.4
Governments that show themselves unable or unwilling to deal with these ac-
celerating pressures stand to lose legitimacy. When they do, people turn to the
more immediate group or community to which they belong in search of
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support, identity, and security. But individual groups in such situations often
feel they must compete directly against each other for scarce resources and ser-
vices; governments may even encourage such splits, in classic divide-and-rule
fashion. All too often, the end result is a polarization and splintering of societies,
literally inviting violent responses to unresolved problems. Reacting to such
problems, central governments may seek to impose authoritarian solutions.
Whatever they do, the society may unravel and collapse.
Social and Economic Inequities
In recent decades, the gap between rich and poor has grown dramatically. Ac-
cording to statistics compiled by the UN Development Program, in 1960 those
in the top 20 percent worldwide had thirty times the income of those in the bot-
tom 20 percent; by the beginning of the 1990s, they had almost sixty times as
much, and in 1997, seventy-four times.5 This gaping disparity is replicated
within individual countries, more severely in some than in others. In the con-
text of globalization, the inequitable distribution of economic opportunities
and social burdens is becoming more pronounced. Sharp economic inequities
are producing cleavages and discrepancies that may lead to social conflict and
perhaps even collapse.
The lack of adequate numbers of jobs in countries with burgeoning youthful
populations is creating widespread social discontent. Worldwide, an estimated
sixty million people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four already cannot
find work. The pressure on labor markets is bound to intensify with strong pop-
ulation growth. The phenomenon of legions of young adults and adolescents
with uncertain and often poor prospects for establishing a livelihood may be one
of the greatest threats to political stability anywhere—triggering criminal be-
havior, feeding discontent that can burst open in street rioting, or fomenting po-
litical extremism.
China, for instance, is struggling to provide sufficient employment for hun-
dreds of millions of its people as it prunes state-owned industries and slashes
their workforces, and as the economic gulf between coastal areas and the interior
widens. An estimated one to three hundred million itinerant Chinese laborers
are drifting from rural to urban areas, and in and out of towns. It is very much
in question whether these people will be able to find secure and adequate em-
ployment. The lack of jobs may have fatal implications for social stability in
China and may well make internal conflict more likely in the future. Critical
decisions await China as it moves ahead with a combination of economic liber-
alization and political repression. This is a more realistic danger than external
Chinese aggression.
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Unemployment and severe economic hardship and uncertainty nourish ex-
tremist politics and violence. Although the particular circumstances of each case
need careful analysis and can generate vastly different outcomes, a few addi-
tional examples underline the potential dangers. One is Kosovo, where the
Kosovo Liberation Army had little difficulty enlisting fighters from among a
population that is predominantly young and unemployed. In Rwanda, extremist
Hutu leaders recruited primarily uneducated, unemployed youths—individuals
who had little hope of gainful employment and a steady livelihood—into mili-
tias that carried out genocidal violence in 1994 against ethnic Tutsi, whom the
leaders depicted as responsible for the country’s problems. Lack of jobs and dim
economic prospects have also played an important role in fueling the savage
conflict in Algeria. In East Timor, the violent gangs armed by the Indonesian
military to thwart the territory’s move toward independence were drawn in part
from among the ranks of the unemployed. While not every unemployed person
of today will become tomorrow’s extremist shock trooper, people’s willingness
to tolerate and perpetrate violence will be far higher if they have little hope for
the future.
Environmental Stress
In this connection, environmental conditions are increasingly critical. The de-
pletion of water resources, excessive exploitation of fisheries, degradation of ar-
able land, and deforestation, among other problems, not only affect human health
and well-being and imperil the habitability of some regions but play an important
role, as is increasingly understood, in generating or exacerbating conflicts.6
Many natural systems—such as croplands, forests, and freshwater
sources—show signs of increasing stress.7 If climate change becomes a
full-blown reality, it will compound present environmental challenges. Rising
sea levels, shifting vegetation zones, and changing precipitation patterns are
among the key impacts of climate change. If heavily populated coastal areas are
inundated and crop harvests in some regions are decimated by more frequent
droughts, to cite just two possible consequences, there could be dramatic in-
creases in food insecurity. A flood of environmental refugees—displaced resi-
dents of engulfed coastal areas and farmers compelled to abandon their parched
lands—may find it difficult to find new livelihoods in already crowded cities and
may even clash with host communities. It is obviously impossible to predict ei-
ther the dynamics of such a scenario or how well societies will cope, but in all like-
lihood, such changes would translate into a sharp increase in human conflict.
Countries whose economies are heavily geared toward agriculture, or other
sectors that directly depend on the health of the natural-resource base, are most
immediately confronted by environmental problems. The needs and interests of
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contending groups tied closely to the land—farmers, nomads, ranchers, and re-
source extractors—often are at odds and remain unreconciled. Conflicts over
scarce land and water abound. As cases from Mexico, Nigeria, Sudan, Papua New
Guinea, India, and other countries show, poorer communities, minority groups,
and indigenous peoples typically bear the brunt of adverse environmental
change, particularly that triggered by oil drilling, mining, logging, and
large-scale dam and irrigation projects.
Depending on how environmental transformation translates into the social,
economic, and political realms, environmental decline could grow into an in-
creasingly significant factor in violent disputes in the coming decades. What
matters most in this regard is not necessarily the hardships of environmental
degradation per se but the fact that the harmful impacts will be felt unevenly by
different social strata, communities,
and countries. This unevenness may
well reinforce social and economic
inequities and deepen patterns of
polarization in society. For instance,
the Sardar-Sarovar dam and irriga-
tion project in India’s Narmada Valley will primarily benefit a small number of
wealthy farmers, while the burdens—flooding of villages and arable land, deci-
mation of local fisheries, and loss of ancestral land and cultural monu-
ments—will fall on hundreds of thousands of poorer peasants.
Because it is the weakest and poorest countries that most readily succumb to
environmental challenges, it is tempting to conclude that only marginal areas
around the globe will be affected, not the regions of “strategic” importance to
the United States. This is likely to be a miscalculation. Let us again look at China.
Eleven of China’s interior provinces, collectively home to a third of the country’s
population, are faced with severe water shortages and soil erosion. Soil degrada-
tion and outright loss of cropland are putting increasing strain on China’s agri-
culture. If China were to become a major grain importer in coming years and
decades, it surely would drive up world food prices and affect other grain im-
porters, many of which might not be able to afford a higher import bill. China is
also facing rising internal disputes over water sharing. Large-scale river-diver-
sion projects could trigger major interprovincial conflict and pose challenges to
the central government. For instance, a planned diversion of the Huang He (Yel-
low River) would benefit Shanxi Province (which is struggling with chronic and
severe water shortages) but potentially cripple northern Henan and northwestern
Shandong Provinces during the dry season.
On the whole, environmentally induced conflict appears to be far more likely
within than between nations (although the repercussions of internal conflicts
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can, of course, be felt beyond the borders of the affected country). Water is one
of the issues around which substantial transboundary conflicts exist—for exam-
ple, among the countries sharing the waters of the Nile (Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia),
the Euphrates (Turkey, Syria, Iraq), the Jordan and Litani (Israel, Jordan, Syria),
the Ganges (India, Bangladesh—between whom at least temporary agreement
has been reached), the Mekong (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, China),
and the West Bank aquifers (Israel and the Palestinians).
There are three ways in which environmental breakdown may be of concern
to the United States. One regards the political repercussions of environmental
change: conflict that is at least in part fueled by environmental change and may
destabilize a given country or region. This encompasses scenarios that do not
differ substantially from the kinds of conflicts that we are familiar with today.
The second concerns people who have been referred to as “environmental
refugees.” Water scarcity, soil erosion, desertification, and other environmental
calamities are now contributing to the uprooting of large numbers, though reli-
able (or even simply uncontroversial) estimates do not exist. The influx of peo-
ple into another region or country can impose a considerable burden in terms of
increased competition for land, water, jobs, communal facilities, and social ser-
vices. This is especially the case if the host country’s economy is already stagnant
or in decline, or if the influx is sudden and massive. Although population move-
ments do not inevitably cause conflict, the potential for trouble is present. This
is particularly the case where political leaders or challengers are eager to stir up
antiforeigner sentiments.
The third concerns the impact of environmental change itself. The gathering
threat of climate change is probably the best illustration. If extensive climate
change becomes manifest, no individual country or society—no matter how
rich or militarily powerful—will be able to shield itself from the consequences.
Because China relies heavily on coal (the most carbon intensive of the fossil fu-
els) to sustain economic growth, its share of worldwide CO2 emissions has risen
dramatically. As climate change is transformed into a reality rather than a pre-
diction, the pushing and shoving among nations over who is to blame for the ca-
lamity will rise to a fever pitch. Already, commentary in the United States is
indulging in finger-pointing, singling out China as a culprit. Clearly, if China
does not move away from a coal-dominated energy system, it will aggravate the
likelihood that climate change will wreak major havoc. But it is the United States
and other Western nations that have, over the course of the last century, pumped
the bulk of carbon into the atmosphere and who are therefore, in a sense, pri-
marily responsible. It is possible that in a warming world, accusations and
counteraccusations will contribute to a rise in political tensions.
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So the questions arise: What policies are required for the security of the envi-
ronment? How do we influence nations who are damaging the world environ-
ment? What must be deterred? The last question may point to a dead end,
however; no conceivable military strategies are appropriate for addressing envi-
ronmental threats. Entire economic structures cannot be changed at gunpoint.
Although a whole new field of inquiry—“environmental security”—has
emerged, it is worth stressing that environmental change is hardly ever con-
sciously employed as a “weapon” by one state against another. The burning of
the Kuwaiti oil fields by Iraq and the defoliation of Vietnamese jungles by the
United States are examples of environmental destruction for military or other
hostile purposes, but the preponderance of environmental change arises as the
result of the ordinary working of economies, day after day. Just as the Chinese
are not burning coal in their power plants in order to inundate coastal areas of
the United States, Americans are not driving their cars in order to cause more
powerful storm surges in India or more severe droughts in Africa. Therefore,
and even though environmental change can become a “security threat,” mili-
tary responses are inappropriate.
Globalization
What prospects does globalization hold for matters of peace and security? As na-
tional economies become more and more integrated and as economic interests
coincide less and less with national boundaries, will there still be a major role for
national armed forces? It is tempting to conclude that increasing interdependence
will of necessity lead to new cooperation and that armed forces will become su-
perfluous. This expectation is reinforced by the dawning recognition that individ-
ual nations are unable to cope on their own with such global challenges as climate
change and other transboundary forms of environmental degradation.
Can economic integration, then, be an antidote to violent conflict? This
seems to be a premise of many advocates of economic globalization. In fact,
globalization’s challenge to traditional notions of territorial-based security may
over time make military-centered concepts of security less relevant—but such
an outcome is by no means guaranteed. There is, indeed, danger in expecting
that the erosion of economic borders will inevitably lead to political integration
far beyond national boundaries and to the melting away of remaining enmities.
Economic integration may be an effective antidote to warfare between industri-
ally advanced states that are close to the commanding heights of the world eco-
nomic system (and are therefore most likely to benefit from it), but far less so for
those who are at its periphery.
Because it deeply affects the prospects for social and economic development,
the process of globalization too carries the potential for tension and conflict.
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The benefits and burdens of globalization are distributed in spectacularly un-
even fashion, heightening disparities between and within nations. Because it en-
tails severe dislocation and social pain, and because it is experienced as a
challenge to local control and democratic accountability, economic globaliza-
tion tears at the very fabric of many societies.
POLICY CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS
The Cold War may be over, but it has left a deadly legacy. East-West geopolitics
ascribed strategic value to certain parts of the developing world, mostly for rea-
sons of resource endowment or geographic location; the industrialized coun-
tries accordingly intervened in a variety of ways, arming their protégés to the
teeth. Once this confrontation ended, the significance of many once-indispens-
able allies vanished. “Hot” Cold War battlegrounds like Afghanistan, the Horn
of Africa, or Central America, abruptly abandoned, reverted to backwater status.
What remains are the weapons that were so liberally spread around the planet
by both superpowers and their allies. Together with pervasive cultures of vio-
lence and stunted political systems, the surfeit of weapons makes for fertile
ground for violent and authoritarian responses to unresolved problems—in-
cluding the social and environmental challenges discussed earlier. Of particular
concern are small arms—weapons that are cheap, require no organizational or
training infrastructures for maintenance and operation, can be used even by
children, can be easily transported and smuggled, and are rugged enough to
have a long life. No precise figures exist, but it is believed that there are currently
some five hundred million small arms in worldwide circulation, including more
than a hundred million assault rifles.8
Michael Klare, director of the Five College Program in Peace and World Secu-
rity Studies in Amherst, Massachusetts, argues that “the abundance of arms at
every level of society means that any increase in intercommunal tensions and
hostility will entail an increased likelihood of armed violence and bloodshed.”9
The dispersal of arms to private armies and militias, insurgent groups, criminal or-
ganizations, and other nonstate actors feeds in many societies a cycle of political,
communal, and criminal violence that in turn causes even greater demand for guns.
Nonproliferation and the Universality of Disarmament Norms
All this undercuts a frequent assumption of contemporary security analysis in
this country: that the possession of unrivaled weapons technology and
power-projection capabilities is a key advantage for the United States, and by ex-
tension that if there is no U.S. military response to a particular crisis or develop-
ment, there will be no response at all. But in the post–Cold War era,
military-technological superiority is of far less utility than when the United
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States was still locked in competition with the Soviet Union. Given the enor-
mous proliferation of weaponry of almost all kinds and calibers, and the strong
likelihood that any given advanced arms technology will eventually spread to
other countries, a strong argument can be made that the United States has a key
interest in establishing internationally accepted and effective norms and stan-
dards to curb the production, possession, and trade of arms; there are few such
restraints today.
It has been U.S. policy for several years to pursue “nonproliferation.” This ap-
proach is designed to deny access to advanced weapons and military technology
to any state except the United States
and a few close allies—a glorified
military apartheid system. While no-
body can argue that a deliberate pro-
liferation policy would make the
world any safer, it is unlikely that a
narrow nonproliferation strategy
will prove workable. No country that felt itself under a severe threat would ac-
quiesce to it. Any realistic policy of armament restraint would have to accept the
principle of universality and apply to all states equally. That would seem, from
the U.S. viewpoint, tantamount to adopting a policy detrimental to one’s inter-
ests. However, in today’s world, one’s own security is typically enhanced by mak-
ing others feel secure as well.
There are additional nontraditional, multilateral security policies that may
yield greater benefits than unilateral ones. They include cooperative interna-
tional policies, improved early conflict recognition and conflict prevention, and
strengthened international institutions and norms. Unfortunately, such goals
have in recent years been neglected, even undermined.
It is interesting, however, to contrast current U.S. policy with its stance in the
aftermath of World War II. Back then, the United States played a central role in
creating the United Nations and other multilateral institutions. Today, when at
last there is no superpower competition to thwart the effectiveness of the UN,
the United States has abandoned multilateralism and is instead pursuing a pol-
icy of exceptionalism. That is, the United States would like to see other powers
respect existing rules, norms, and constraints but does not wish to be bound by
them itself. In fact, the other major powers do not either, failing, like the United
States, to see the value of creating multilateral institutions that support their in-
terests without draining their resources. They, like this country, frequently see
international treaties and norms as eroding national power. A different view
would suggest that though the United States, by strengthening rules and norms
that make the use of force by any state less likely, might “lose” the ability to
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exercise its military power in unrestrained fashion, it would also lose the need
to do so.
Exceptionalism, however, has led the administration and Congress to block
progress on emerging international norms. When the majority of nations de-
cided to ban antipersonnel land mines, the Clinton administration refused to
sign; when the United Nations drafted an agreement to outlaw the recruiting by
armies of children age seventeen or younger, the United States objected; when
the statute for a new International Criminal Court was drawn up in Rome in
1998, the U.S. delegation was one of a handful that voted against it.10 Meanwhile,
Congress has brought the United Nations to the brink of financial insolvency by
withholding legally owed contributions. Face-to-face discussions between rep-
resentatives of the UN Security Council and the Congress hold some promise
that the issue of U.S. financial arrears will be resolved, but a true breakthrough
has yet to occur.
Institution Building and Conflict Prevention
It is imperative that the world community put far greater emphasis on prevent-
ing violent conflict—not only because conflicts are hard to resolve once they
start (witness Bosnia and Kosovo and the major, long-term U.S. commitment
required by these interventions) but also because the United States and other
powers will naturally be selective about which conflicts they get involved in, hence
allowing savage tragedies like Rwanda, Angola, or Sudan to go on indefinitely.
Much could be accomplished by building a conflict-early-warning network,
establishing permanent dispute-arbitration centers in every region of the world,
putting more weight behind preventive diplomacy, and establishing a corps of
skilled and experienced people to serve as roving mediators on behalf of the in-
ternational community.11 Conflict prevention is not an exact science, to be sure;
it more resembles a trial-and-error process. On one hand, there will be cases
when warnings of impending violence turn out to be false alarms. On the other
hand, though, the international community would do well to build some redun-
dancy into the conflict-prevention apparatus, so that a variety of efforts can be
launched to ward off mass violence. Preventing the eruption of disputes into
full-scale hostilities is by no means an easy task, yet its difficulties pale beside
those of ending fighting once large-scale bloodshed has occurred.
Of course, conflict prevention through mediation will not always work; addi-
tional tools are needed. In particular, peacekeeping missions will need to be re-
fashioned so as to fulfill the true meaning of the word “peacekeeping,” instead of
being last-minute fire brigades. In the course of the last few years, we have come
to associate peacekeeping with futility—too few people equipped too poorly
and dispatched too late, unable to keep a peace that scarcely exists. What is
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needed is a well trained, permanent force maintained under UN auspices for
preventive deployments. It would be dispatched in response to clear signs of im-
minent violence, either along national borders or even within countries. Such an
intervention would not be an end in itself but rather an attempt to provide space
for mediation efforts.
Currently, U.S. policy is to constrict the UN’s capability to engage in successful
peacekeeping and to limit the involvement of American personnel in United Na-
tions missions. It is time to chart a new course, to signal to the rest of the world that
this nation is serious about multilateral peacekeeping and conflict prevention.
N O T E S
1. Margareta Sollenberg, ed., States in Armed
Conflict 1998, Report 54 (Uppsala, Sweden:
Uppsala Univ., Department of Peace and
Conflict Research, 1999).
2. Project Ploughshares, Armed Conflicts Report
’99 (Waterloo, Ont.: Institute of Peace and
Conflict Studies, Summer 1999).
3. Paul Kennedy, Robert S. Chase, and Emily B.
Hill, “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy,” For-
eign Affairs, January–February 1996.
4. This is discussed at length in my book
Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline,
Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1996).
5. United Nations Development Programme,
Human Development Report, various editions
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press).
6. The literature on the links between environ-
ment and conflict has grown rapidly in recent
years. See, for instance, the author’s Fighting
for Survival; Thomas Homer-Dixon and
Jessica Blitt, eds., Ecoviolence: Links among
Environment, Population, and Security
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield,
1998); Donald Kennedy et al., Environmental
Quality and Regional Conflict: A Report to the
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflict (Washington, D.C.: 1998); and
Alexander Carius and Kurt M. Lietzmann,
eds., Environmental Change and Security
(Berlin: Springer, 1999). See also the occa-
sional reports published by the Environmental
Change and Security Project of the Woodrow
Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.
7. See the Worldwatch Institute’s two annual
publications, State of the World and Vital
Signs (both published by W. W. Norton in
New York), for example.
8. For more detail, see the author’s Small Arms,
Big Impact: The Next Challenge of Disarma-
ment, Worldwatch Paper 137 (Washington,
D.C.: October 1997).
9. Michael T. Klare, “Light Weapons Diffusion
and Global Violence in the Post–Cold War
Era,” in Light Weapons and International Se-
curity, ed. Jasjit Singh (Delhi: Indian Pugwash
Society and British-American Security Infor-
mation Council, December 1995).
10. See Michael N. Schmitt and Peter J. Richards,
“Into Uncharted Waters: The International
Criminal Court,” Naval War College Review,
Winter 2000, pp. 93–136.
11. I have discussed these proposals at greater
length in Ending Violent Conflict, Worldwatch
Paper 146 (Washington, D.C.: April 1996).
5 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 53 [2000], No. 4, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol53/iss4/5
